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The Corpus Juris: a bold step
by Simone White
In the autumn of 1996, a draft for a 
unified body of rules to deal with 
criminal offences affecting the EU budget 
(M Delmas Marty (ed) (1997) Corpus 
Juris: introducing penal provisions Jor the 
purpose of the financial interests of the 
European Union, ECONOMICA, Paris) 
was produced by a team of criminal 
lawyers. The Union budget (and in 
particular its income) has proved 
vulnerable to fraud, as has been well 
documented in the media and various EU 
and other publications.
It is not possible here to give a full 
account of the Corpus Juris ('CJ'), but it 
may suffice to say that it is set under two 
titles: Title I deals with principles of 
criminal law (art. 1 17) while Title II 
proposes to unify- criminal procedure 
within the EU. The introduction of this 
new institution would have far-reachingo
consequences. The most controversial of 
these proposals is perhaps the creation of 
a European Public Prosecutor (EPP) 
located in Brussels, with delegated EPPs 
based in the Member States, with a duty 
to prosecute frauds affecting the EU 
budget (Articles 18 and 19 of the CJ).
A group of EU academics, including 
the authors of the draft CJ and tour 
rapporteurs, is now engaged in a vast 
exercise to assess the compatibility of the 
CJ with their national laws and to review 
existing provisions with regard to mutual 
assistance in criminal matters. The 
exercise promises to yield very valuable 
information on Member States' criminal 
justice systems and on the way the 
Member States cooperate in criminal 
cases involving EU funds. The 'suivi duo
CJ' (CJ follow-up) study will also flesh 
out ideas in the individual Member States 
on the way to improve the fight against 
fraud and corruption affecting the EU 
budget. It is a valuable exercise from 
which much can be learned.
Apart from the problem of 
compatibility with national laws, the CJ 
text raises the (comparatively neglected) 
problem of its compatibility with EU law. 
I would like to raise a few issues in this 
context. First, the CJ, if it is to be
adopted, needs a legal basis in EU law. 
Secondly, the provisions contained in 
Article 28 of the CJ (on appeals to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ)) raise 
the question of whether it would be 
possible for the ECJ, as it is presently 
constituted, to fulfil the role envisaged. 
Thirdly, the introduction of an EPP needs 
to be considered from a constitutional 
point of view. Lastly the compatibility of 
the CJ with Articles 226-233 needs to be 
considered.
LEGAL BASIS FOR THE CJ
The CJ is a remarkable text. One 
assumes that it will be revised after July- 
1999, and continue its progress. One 
important consideration when revising it 
should be knowing where it will fit in the 
legal architecture of the EU, for this will 
define the way it is re-drafted. Will it be 
re-drafted as a convention, or a 
framework regulation, or as a (more 
precise) first pillar regulation, destined to 
have direct effect in the Member States? 
The determination of its future legal basiso
seems essential.
The first pillar option
Opinions differ as to whether the CJ 
could be integrated into the 'first pillar' 
(which regulates economic activity) after 
the Treatv of Amsterdam is ratified, 
under Article 280 (amended Article 
209(a)), which reads:
'(1) The Community and the Member States 
shall counter fraud and any other illegal 
activities affecting the financial interests of 
the Community through measures to be 
taken in accordance with this Article, 
which shall act a deterrent and be such as 
to ajjord effective protection in the 
Member States.
(2) Member States shall take the same 
measures to counter fraud affecting the 
financial interests of the Community as 
they take to counter Jraud affecting their 
ownjinancial interests.
(3) Without prejudice to other provisions of 
this Treaty, the Member States shall
coordinate their action aimed at 
protecting the financial interests of the 
Community against Jraud. To this end 
they shall organise, together with the 
Commission, close and regular 
cooperation between the competent 
authorities.
(4) The Council, acting in accordance with 
the procedure referred to in Article 251, 
after consulting with the Court of 
Auditors, shall adopt the necessary 
measures in the fields of the prevention of 
and fight against fraud affecting the 
financial interests of the Community with 
a view to affording effective and equivalent 
protection in the Member States. These 
measures shall not concern the 
application of national criminal law or 
the national administration of justice.
(5) The Commission, in cooperation with 
Member States, shall each year submit to 
the European Parliament and to the 
Council a report on the measures taken Jor 
the implementation of this Article.'
The difficulty for the CJ seems to 
reside with paragraph 4 of the article, 
which excludes measures concerning theo
application of national criminal law or 
the national administration of justice (a 
stipulation also to be found in the newly 
inserted Article 135 on Customs 
Cooperation). Some academics have 
argued that the CJ could be adopted
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under Article 280, since its effects would 
be complementary to national criminal 
law and would not therefore interfere 
with its application (see, e.g., 
K Tiedemann (1997) 'Pour un espace 
juridique commun apres Amsterdam', 
AGON, No. 17, p. 12-13). Even if this 
were the case, however, some Member 
States might balk at the qualified majority 
requirement contained in Article 280 
and might prefer a less ambiguous legal 
basis, as well as one requiring unanimity 
(see S White (1998) 'Protection of the 
financial interests of the European 
Communities: the fight against fraud ando o
corruption', Kluwer European Monographs, 
No. 15, p. 185-197).
Other first pillar legal bases have been 
mooted, such as Articles 308 (ex Article 
235), which has often been called a 
'catch all', or Article 100(a), which has 
previously been used in an attempt to 
impose minimum standards and to 
'regulate out' financial crime. Directives 
in particular have been used to 
harmonise criminal laws, so the 
possibility of either of these legal bases 
being adopted to unify criminal laws and 
procedures cannot be ruled out 
completely, should the political will be 
present. (S White (1997) 'EC Criminal 
law: prospects for the Corpus Juris', 
Journal oj Financial Crime, Vol. 5, No. 3, 
p. 223-231)
The third pillar option
Article 31 (e) (ex Article K3) mentions 
measures against organised crime, whicho o '
in view of the wide definition now given 
to organised crime, would appear to 
cover transnational fraud and corruption 
affecting the EU budget. (See S White, 
ibid.)
FAR REACHING CONSEQUENCES
The introduction of this new 
institution would have far-reaching 
consequences. The most controversial 
of these proposals is perhaps the 
creation of a European Public 
Prosecutor (EPP) located in Brussels, 
with delegated EPPs based in the 
Member States, with a duty- to 
prosecute frauds affecting the EU 
budget.
It must be remembered that the CJ 
was introduced partly because 'third 
pillar' (justice and home affairs) 
instruments (not unlike traditional 
international instruments) were 
perceived to be deficient in tackling fraud 
and corruption affecting the EU budget. 
The main criticisms were that ratification 
was slow, and that implementation was 
not subject to scrutiny. Eooking at the 
third pillar after Amsterdam, it is clear 
that Treaty changes have aimed to speed 
up procedures (see Article 34(2)(d)), and 
that framework decisions might prove a 
useful tool, since they are binding on the 
Member States.
The CJ (or parts of the CJ) could, 
therefore, in theory become a third pillar 
instrument, although we understand that 
this is not the option favoured by the 
Commission.
Closer cooperation
Title VII of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
makes provision for enhanced 
cooperation for Member States who wish 
to 'forge ahead' in matters of 
cooperation. It is possible therefore, to 
envisage a scenario where a group of 
member states would adopt the CJ. This 
would of course add complexity to the 
present arrangements and may, in the 
short term at least, defeat the object of a 
'unified' system within the EU. It could 
however provide a 'pilot phase' for the 
CJ, in the spirit of variable geometry.
Implications of legal basis 
uncertainty
The CJ looks to the unification of 
criminal laws and procedures in the 
member states, an aim not explicit in 
the original treaties, and not hitherto 
fullv discussed at inter-governmental
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conferences with an instrument such as 
the CJ in mind. One would therefore not 
expect to find a tailor-made legal basis for 
the CJ. Yet given political will, the CJ (or 
parts of the CJ) may find a home in the 
existing structure.o
PROPOSED ROLE OF THE 
ECJ IN THE CORPUS JURIS
Article 28 oftheCJ reads:
'(1 )The Court of Justice has jurisdiction to 
rule on ojfences as defined above (Articles 1 to 
8) in three cases:
(a) preliminary questions on the
interpretation oj the Corpus and any 
application measures;
(b) on the request of a Member State or the 
Commission on any dispute concerning 
the application of the Corpus;
(c) on the request of the EPP or a national 
legal authority on conflicts of jurisdiction 
regarding application oj the rules on the 
principle of European territoriality, 
concerning both the public prosecution 
sen'ices (Articles 18 and 24) and the 
exercise of judicial control by national 
courts (Articles 25 to 27).
(2) When a question of interpretation is 
raised or a conflict of jurisdiction 
brought before a court of one of the 
Member States, this court may, if it 
considers that a decision on this point is 
necessary in order to give its judgment, 
call on the Court of Justice to rule on 
the issue.
(3) When an issue or conflict such as this is 
raised in a case pending before a 
national court whose decisions are not 
subject to appeal in national law, this 
court is bound to seise the Court of 
Justice.'
At first sight, this article is an amalgam 
of Article 234 (ex Article 177 EC) and 
the clauses found in third pillar 
conventions granting the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction to rule on 
disputes. However it goes beyond powers 
hitherto granted to the ECJ.
Under (a) the ECJ would be called to 
give preliminary rulings on the
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interpretation of the CJ   that is to say on 
the implementation in the national 
criminal law of a Member State of the CJ 
provisions. These implementation 
measures could relate either to 
substantive law (application of Articles 
1  17 of the CJ) or to criminal procedure 
(Articles 18-35 of the CJ). Such 
preliminary rulings would then be 
binding on all Member States, thus 
reinforcing the uniformity of procedure 
and approach to the CJ.
Preliminary rulings could originate 
from a Member State in order to 
determine the validity of criminal law or 
procedure of another Member State. The 
ECJ has already ruled over questions by a 
court of a Member State in order to 
determine the validity of a law of another 
Member State. However it has refused 
jurisdiction in politically-sensitive cases 
because it considered the proceedings to
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have been manufactured for the purposes 
of testing a foreign law (see, for example, 
Ebg/ia y Nowe//o (Case 104/79) [1980] 
ECR 745 and (Case 244/80) [1981] ECR 
3045)). The ECJ would therefore be 
moving into uncharted territories, and 
politicisation might be difficult to avoid.
Historically, the preliminary ruling 
procedure has worked well and has 
promoted uniformity of interpretation in 
the Member States. However the 
procedure can be lengthy (18 months or 
more). There would be a need to ensure 
that the preliminary ruling procedure is 
not used purely as a delaying tactic. Such 
tactics could be counter-productive in 
the fight against fraud and corruption 
affecting the EU budget.
FURTHER READING
A fuller account of the Corpus Juris 
proposals can be found in S White 
(1998) 'EC Criminal Law: Prospects 
for the Corpus Juris',/ouma/ o^Einancia/ 
Chme, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 223-231.
For background, see also S White 
(1998) 'Protection of the financial 
interests of the European 
Communities: the fight against fraud 
and corruption', K/uwer European 
MonoarapA;, No. 15, p. 179ff.
The willingness of national courts to 
refer under Article 177 EC has varied 
greatly across the European Union. In 
view of this, it might be useful to monitor 
and issue a yearly report on preliminary 
rulings dealt with by the ECJ in the 
context of the CJ.
The question of the lack of 
specialisation of the ECJ cannot be 
avoided. This has already been 
highlighted in relation to third pillar
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matters. One solution proposed in 1996, 
and which may be worth resurrecting, 
was that a specialised court be established 
(see 'The role and future of the European 
Court of Justice', 1996; a report by 
members of the EC section of the British 
Insitute's Advisory Board, chaired by The 
Rt Hon Lord Slynn of Hadley, British 
Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, p. 98fT). Specialised 
Community courts already exist (the 
Community Patent Appeals Court, Board 
of Appeal on Community Trade Marks),
so the proposal is not as outlandish as it 
first appears. If a specialised court were 
to be adopted, delays could of course be 
reduced to a minimum. However, the 
creation of a specialised court would 
require a treaty amendment.
Another proposal was that the ECJ 
could become more like the US Federal 
Court and act as the court of last instance 
as far as certain Community matters are 
concerned (op. cit., 1996 Report). If the 
ECJ were to have this role in relation 
with the CJ, this would have the effect of 
removing the need for preliminary 
rulings.
Articles 28(l)(b) and (c) of the CJ give 
the Commission and the EPP the right to 
refer a case to the ECJ on any dispute 
concerning the application of the CJ. 
This differs from Article 234 (ex Article 
177) which only enables properly 
constituted courts and tribunals o^ fAe 
member state; to make references to the 
ECJ. The ECJ has ruled in fretore a"i 5a/u 
(fretore di Sa/u vX (Case 14/86) [1987] 
ECR 2545; [1989] 1 CMLR71)thatthe 
acceptance of a reference from a body 
acting in an investigative capacity could 
be justified in the following 
circumstances:
'TAe Court Aasyurija'icfion to rep/y to a 
reauesf Jor a pre/iminary ru/ina i^tAaf request 
emanafes^rom a court or friAuna/ wAicA Aas 
acfea* in fAe genera/jrameworA o^its fasA o^ 
jua^ina, ina'epena'enfA/ anj in accordance 
wifA tAe /aw, cases coming witAin fAe 
yurisa'iction conferred* on it Ay /aw, eren 
fAou^A certain functions o^fAaf court or 
triAuna/ in fAe proceeaVnas wAicA ^awe rise to 
fAe reference Jor a pre/iminary ru/ina are not, 
sfrict/y speaAin^, o^ayuJicia/ nature'.
Current constitutional arrangements 
appear to rule out the possibility 
of the Commission or the EPP makingo
references to the ECJ. Articles 28(l)(b) 
and (c) would require Treat)' amendments.
INTRODUCTION OF AN EPP
The introduction of a European Public 
Prosecutor, a sixth Community 
institution (or institution of the EU 
depending on the legal basis chosen for 
the CJ) means that the Treaty would have 
to be amended.
APPLICATION OF EC LAW
Should the CJ become a first pillar 
instrument, the 'acquis communautaire' 
(that is to say the sum of established EC
law and juris prudence) would apply. 
This means that, inter alia, Treaty Articles 
226-233 (previously Articles 169-176) 
would apply to the CJ.
Treaty Ardc/e 226 (ex ArdcJe J69)
Member States who failed to comply 
with an opinion of the Commission with 
regard to the CJ within the time laid 
down by the Commission might be 
brought to the ECJ.
Treaty Artide 227 (ex Ardde J 70)
A Member State may bring another 
member state to court for failing to fulfilo
an obligation under the Treaty. This is 
covered in article 2 8 of the CJ itself.
Treaty Artic/e 228 (ex Artide / 7 J)
A Member State can be fined for failing 
to take the necessary measures to comply 
with an ECJ judgment within the time 
limits laid down by the Commission. This 
could mean, for example, that failing to 
implement a judgment from the ECJ 
requiring changes in criminal procedure 
could lead to a fine.
Treaty Artic/e 229 (ex ArdcJe J 72)
Article 229 reads:
\Re^u/afions aa'optea'yoinf/y 6y tAe 
European far/iament ana* tAe Cbunci/, ana* Ay 
fAe Cbunci/, pursuant to fAe provisions o^ fAis 
Treaty, may ^ ive fAe Court o^ justice 
un/imitea" Jurisdiction wifA reaara" to fAe 
pena/fies proWt/ea'Jor in sucA reau/ations.'
It is unclear what this may mean in 
practice should the CJ be adopted as a 
regulation. Would this article give the 
ECJ jurisdiction over criminal penalties?
Treaty Artide 230 (ex Artide J 73)
At present the ECJ has the power to 
review the legality of acts adopted jointly 
by the European Parliament and the 
Council, acts of the Council, the 
Commission and of the European 
Central Bank (ECB). It is not known 
whether these review powers would 
extend to the actions of the EPF^ nor is it 
clear to whom the EPP would be 
accountable.
Treaty ArtJcJe 23 J (ex ArficJe J 74)
The ECJ has the power to declare an 
act void. This raises the same question as 
above. 25
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Treaty Article 232 (ex Article 175)
Article 232 gives the ECJ jurisdiction 
to establish infringements committed by 
the European Parliament, the Council, 
the Commission or the ECB. It is unclear 
whether the EPP would be added to this 
list.
Treaty Article 233 (ex Article 1 76)
The institutions named in Article 232, 
except the ECB, are required to take the 
necessary measures to comply with the 
judgment of the ECJ when an act has 
been declared void and when their failure 
to act has been declared contrary to the
Treaty. Would similar obligations also fall 
on the EPP?
CONCLUSION
The above text only highlights some of 
the issues of compatibility of the CJ with 
EU law. It seems important that the CJ be 
tested, line by line, for compatibility not 
only with national criminal law and 
procedure, but also with EU law, in 
relation to the first and the third pillar. 
This would add value to the work now 
being carried out in each of the Member 
States and would point out where 
changes may be required. It is with
trepidation that we await the House of 
Eords report on the CJ, due to be 
published in July 1999. @
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